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ABSTRACT 
Traditionally, information products have been commercially exploited by selling 
copies of the information, with the creator relying on intellectual property rights 
to protect his or her investment in the work. However, software, an intangible 
information product, has typically been licensed. Mass market software is sold 
with a standard licence known as a shrink-wrap licence. 
This paper looks at the interaction of copyright law, mass market software and 
shrink-wrap licences. It suggests that shrink-wrap licences are beneficial as they 
allow software producers to practice price discrimination by restricting the uses 
that may be made of the software. However, as non-negotiated contracts 
between parties of unequal bargaining power, they may also allow software 
producers to expand their rights in the software over and above the rights 
granted by intellectual property law. 
The terms of shrink-wrap licences are typically only available to the purchaser 
after the software is purchased and so the validity of such licences is in doubt 
under black letter contract law. After a discussion of the relevant case law and 
legislation, the paper concludes that New Zealand should validate shrink-wrap 
licences by statute. It discusses how to prevent software producers from using 
valid shrink-wrap licences to create de facto intellectual property rights for 
which there is no commercial justification. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, contents page, footnotes and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14482 words. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Historically, intellectual property has been commercially exploited by selling 
copies of the intellectual property embodied in a tangible object. Hence, it was 
possible to treat contacts for these products in much the same way as contracts 
for other tangible goods. Where information was subject to intellectual property 
laws, the tangible copy of the information was sold subject only to intellectual 
property restrictions. Where it was not subject to intellectual property law, 
information was either protected by means such as trade secrecy and 
confidentiality or was free to be taken by all. 
With the computer revolution of the second half of the 20th century, a 
commercially important industry has developed based on intangible electronic 
information. The fluid nature of this information has made it vulnerable to free 
riders. Consequently, producers have attempted to protect their investment 
through contractual means. The result has been the licensing of rights to use 
information, rather than the sale of a copy of the information. 
However, the combination of intangible information products, new methods of 
contract and intellectual property law has lead to concerns that producers may be 
able to "privatise" a greater amount of information than was possible when 
information products took a tangible form. This concern is principally related to 
the ability of producers of mass market software to present one-sided contracts 
to users in the form of "shrink-wrap" licences. Formerly, there was 
considerable doubt as to the enforceability of such licences. However, recent 
legislative proposals and case law indicate that attitudes to enforceability may be 
becoming more liberal. 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the interaction of copyright law, mass 
market software and contract as it impacts on public access to information. 
Chapter II discusses the development of intangible intellectual property 
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products . Chapter III examines mass market software and shrink-wrap licences . 
Chapters IV and V discuss overseas case law and legislation on shrink-wrap 
licences. Chapter VI considers aspects of the draft Article 2B of the United 
States Uniform Commercial Code, which would validate shrink-wrap licensing 
as part of a separate contractual regime for transactions in intangible 
information. Chapter VII considers how a New Zealand court is likely to treat a 
shrink-wrap licence transaction. Finally, in chapter VIII, I consider what would 
be the optimal response for New Zealand, as a small, net importer of intellectual 
property, to the issue of shrink-wrap licensing. 
II FROM TANGIBLE TO INTANGIBLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A Historical Review 
When the technology for producing literary works consisted of pen and 
parchment, there was no need for a law of copyright. The time and labour 
required to produce a copy precluded wholesale copying, either by the author or 
others. Copying of literary works was encouraged . With the advent of the 
printing press, the commercial exploitation of literary works became possible . 
Printing technology created an opportunity for the author to create and sell 
multiple copies of his or her work. However, it also enabled others to free ride 
by exploiting the work for commercial purposes without recompense to the 
author. The law responded, after a few hundred years, with the development of 
an intellectual property right. 1 Copyright enabled the author to capture the 
benefits of the commercial exploitation of his or her literary work, but allowed 
for public access to the information created. Further , the property right was of 
limited duration and the protected material eventually ended up in the public 
domain. 
1 Statute of Anne 1709 (GB), 8 Anne, c 19 . 
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With the advent of digital technology, 2 the possibilities for the commercial 
exploitation of information have expanded again. A huge industry based on 
digital information has developed. The basic information product of the digital 
economy is software. Software is comprised of a computer program or 
programs. After some years of doubt, computer programs have come to be 
universally recognised as literary works and thus protected by copyright. 3 
Software differs from tangible copyright products in several respects. The most 
important difference is the ease with which software may be copied. While 
tangible copyright products, such as books, are also vulnerable to copying, 
software is especially vulnerable. Copying a book requires some expenditure of 
time and money. However, copying software is instantaneous and practically 
free. 
This was problematic for the development of a mass market for software 
products. A free and competitive market system requires excludability and 
rivalry. 4 These factors were initially missing from the software market because 
of the ease with which software could be copied. 
Excludibilty refers to the ability of sellers to exclude users unless they pay. 5 
Physical goods are naturally excludable as the producer owns them and will not 
hand them over without compensation. Tangible information products are also 
excludable. Excludabilty is artificially created by state guaranteed intellectual 
property rights. It is also naturally present, to a certain extent, because of the 
investment required to produce additional copies. However, when software was 
first developed, it was not clear that it was protected by the laws of intellectual 
2 "Digital technology" refers to the technological ability to reduce information to binary digits. For 
example, books, paintings, music, films, databases and documents may all be recorded 
digitally. These binary digits form a code comprehensible only to a computer. 
3 World Intellectual Property Organisation Copyright Treaty 1996, art 4 [WIPO Copyright Treaty 
1996]. 
4 J Bradford De Long and A Michael Froomkin "The Next Economy?" 2 at 
< http://www.law.miami.edurfroomkin/articles/newecon.htm > (last modified 6 April 
1997) ["The Next Economy"]. 
5 "The Next Economy" above n 4, 2. 
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property. Being cheaply and easily copied, it was difficult for the software 
owner to exclude others from using it. 
Rivalry means that two consumers are not able to use a product as cheaply as 
one. 6 Rivalry exists naturally in tangible goods, including tangible intellectual 
property, because of the investment required to produce extra copies. Software, 
however, is not rival because cost free copying means that no extra resources 
are required to allow additional users to consume the product. 
1 The move to licensing software 
Software required a considerable investment to produce, but lack of 
excludability and rivalry meant it was difficult for the producer to recoup this 
investment from the market. Producers attempted to solve this problem by re-
creating excludability and rivalry through contractual means. This was achieved 
by licensing the purchaser to use the software rather than selling him or her a 
copy. 
(a) provides excludabilty 
If the producer sold a copy of the software, the purchaser was able to freely 
copy, unhindered by intellectual property law or a need for physical resources. 
However, licensing enabled the producers to claim that their programs were 
trade secrets and therefore protected by trade secrecy law. 7 In a licensing 
transaction, the producer could assert a proprietary right in the software and 
bind the licensee to confidentiality. Even when the software was sold to the 
general public, the intangible nature of the software meant that no-one could 
perceive the information merely by looking at the physical medium of the disk. 
As only the licensees were privy to the information, the producer could maintain 
6 "The Next Economy" above n 4, 2. 
7 Mark A Lemley "Intellectual Property and Shrink-Wrap Licenses" (1995) 68 S Cal L Rev 1239, 
1243; Page M Kaufman "The Enforceability of State "Shrink-Wrap" License Statutes in 
Light of Vault Corp. v Quaid Software Ltd" (1988) 74 Cornell L Rev 222, 233. 
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that the software remained confidential. 
excludabilty. 
(b) provides rivalry 
This solved the problem of 
Licensing also allowed the producer to grant the user only a limited right to use 
the information. This was particularly important in the USA, where the "first 
sale doctrine" grants a purchaser certain rights which may not be contractually 
limited by the seller. 8 Licensing enabled the producer to control the user's 
rights to use the information so that the use reflected the price paid. Common 
restrictions to ensure a fair return in respect of use were limits on copying, 
restricting the licensee from allowing others to use the information, restrictions 
on the number of concurrent users, and bans on assignment. This solved the 
problem of rivalry, as producers were able to create a contractual bar to more 
than one user benefiting from the software without paying for the privilege. 
( c) limits liability 
Producers also used the licence to limit their liability to users. The degree to 
which producers may limit liability by contract often turns on whether a 
transaction is subject to statutes regulating the sale of goods. A contract for the 
sale of goods is typically subject to certain implied warrantees. 9 These can 
usually be contracted out of. 10 However, in consumer transactions this ability is 
often limited. 11 The use of licensing and the intangible nature of software raised 
the issue of whether such transactions were sales of goods. 
8 The first sale doctrine has been codified in the Copyright Act 1976, 17 USC s 109 (1998). The 
New Zealand Copyright Act 1994 also has a version of the first sales doctrine. Section 
16(l)(b) makes issuing a work to the public an exclusive right of the copyright owner. 
However, under s 9 this right is limited to putting into circulation copies not previously put 
into circulation. Acts of subsequent distribution or sale of those copies (with the exception 
of the rental of computer programs) are excluded. 
9 The Sale of Goods Act 1908, s 16. 
IO The Sale of Goods Act 1908, s 56. 
11 The Sale of Goods Act 1908, s 56A; Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 . 
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B The Extension of Private Rights in Information? 
Intellectual property rights m computer programs are now universally 
recognised and are embodied in the latest World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO) Copyright Treaty. 12 Thus, the need to re-create 
excludability by contractual means no longer exists. However, licensing 
remains vital to the development of the software industry because of the need to 
create rivalry. Licensing also remains useful as a means of limiting the software 
producer's liability to the end user. Nevertheless, a number of commentators 
are concerned that licensing software gives producers an opportunity to expand 
their private rights in information at the expense of public access. 13 This is due 
to the different impact of copyright on tangible and intangible information 
products. 
Copyright does not protect information or ideas, only the manner in which they 
are expressed. 14 The information or ideas in a book can be accessed by reading, 
which is not a copyright restricted act. The restrictions that are imposed by 
copyright (principally copying and issuing copies to the public) are themselves 
limited. 15 Copyright does not prevent fair uses, such as copying for private 
study. 16 Nor does it limit the distribution of the book after the first sale. 17 It is 
not practical for the information producer to try and limit such uses by contract. 
Even if the purchaser were, for example, bound by contract not to make fair use 
of a book, third parties, who could read the book without copyright 
12 WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 above n 3, art 4. New Zealand has not yet signed the Treaty but 
the Minister of Commerce has stated an intention to do so. (Information supplied by the 
Ministry of Commerce, 23 September 1998). 
13 See, for example, Pamela Samuelson "Legally Speaking: Does Information Really Want to be 
Licensed?", unedited copy, scheduled to be published in September 1998 issue of 
Communications of the ACM < http://s ims . berkeley .edurpam/papers/acm_ 2B .html > (last 
accessed 30 June 1998); Mark A Lemley " Intellectual Property and Shrink-Wrap Licenses" 
(1995) 68 S Cal L Rev 1239. 
14 The "sweat of the brow" cases, such as Water/ow Directories v Reed Information Services Ltd 
[1992) FRS 409, do protect information to a certain extent. However, broadly speaking, the 
statement is correct. 
15 Section 16 of the Copyright Act 1994 lists the acts restricted to the copyright owner. Part III of 
the Act deals with acts permitted in relation to copyright works. 
16 Copyright Act 1994, s 43. 
17 Copyright Act 1994, s 9. 
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infringement, would not be bound. Contract cannot bind these third parties so 
the producer is reliant on state enforced property rights. 
Software is also protected by the law of copyright. 18 However, the crucial 
difference between software and a tangible copyright product such as a book is 
that software does not bear its information on its face. Intangible information 
cannot be comprehended by humans unless it is transformed into tangible form. 
This applies to both the copyrighted object code 19 that makes the computer 
"perform" and to the (possibly copyrighted) information that is displayed on the 
screen. For either to be "read" by a human, the copyrighted object code must 
be copied by a computer. 20 
This will generally be a copyright restricted act. Making a permanent copy of a 
program on the hard disk of computer is generally accepted as a copyright 
restricted act by jurisdictions that protect computer programs as literary works. 
Transfer of the program to the random access memory (RAM) for ephemeral 
display is accepted as a copyright restricted act in England, 21 and by a line of 
controversial cases in the USA. 22 Whether ephemeral display should be a 
copyright restricted act was a topic of fierce debate at the negotiations on the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996.23 The situation is unclear in New Zealand. 
Section 2 of the Copyright Act 1994 defines "copying" as reproducing or 
recording the work in any material form, including, in relation to a literary 
work, storing the work in any medium by any means. The term "material 
form" may or may not include transient copying. However, even if such 
copying is not forbidden by the law of copyright, the licensor can bind the 
18 The Copyright Act 1994, s 2, states that "literary work" includes a computer program. Some 
computer programs have also been granted patent protection overseas but this is rare. 
19 Object code consists of a series of ls and Os that are read by the computer in executing the 
program . 
20 There are certain limited exceptions to this. It is possible to reverse engineer object code. 
21 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (UK), s 17(6). 
22 Triad Systems v Southeastem Express Co (1995) 64 F 3d 1330 (9th Cir); MAI Sys Corp v Peak 
Computer Inc (1993) 991 F 2d 511 (9th Cir); Advanced Computer Systems v MAI Systems 
Corp 845 (1994) F Supp 356 (ED Va). 
23 The final Treaty did not refer to the subject. 
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original licensee through contract so that it may not provide such access to third 
parties. 
Thus, in order to legally access the information in the software, it is necessary 
to become a licensee. A licensee may be bound with all sorts of restrictions that 
are not imposed by copyright law. As licensees are invariably restricted from 
allowing others to use the software, it becomes impossible for anyone not bound 
by the licence restrictions to access the information. This provides software 
producers with an opportunity to use contract as a means of creating new de 
facto intellectual property rights. 
The producers' position has been further strengthened by the development of 
technical means to enforce contractual limits . For example, programs may be 
designed to limit the number of concurrent users of software to the number 
specified in the licence. Or a program may be protected from copying. These 
technical devices have become increasingly important as software producers 
have gained legal protection against attempts to disable such devices. 24 
III MASS MARKET SOFTWARE AND SHRINK-WRAP LICENCES 
Software may be broadly divided into two types, customised and mass market. 25 
Customised software is created to the customer's requirements, there is a direct 
relationship between the parties and the terms of the contract are negotiated 
between them. In contrast, mass market software is standardised and mass 
produced. It is offered to the public via a standard form, non-negotiated 
contract. There is usually a chain of supply between the producer and user. 
The software is ordinarily delivered via the sale of a disk or CD-ROM. 
24 The New Zealand Copyright Act 1994, s 226, makes illegal the provision of devices intended to 
circumvent copy-protection of electronic copyright works. The WIPO Copyright Treaty 
1996, art 11 , obliges signatories to provide adequate legal protection against the 
circumvention of technological measures used to protect copyright works. 
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Mass market software typically contains what is known as a shrink-wrap licence. 
This is a licence packaged with the disk containing the software. 26 The terms of 
the licence may or may not be visible without opening the package. A notice on 
the packaging alerts the purchaser to the presence of the licence and states that 
the purchaser agrees to the licence by opening the shrink-wrap packaging. 
The on-line vers10n of such licences are called click-wrap licences. On 
accessing the software, the purchaser proceeds through a series of screens that 
alert him or her to the existence of the terms and offer an opportunity to read 
them. The user cannot proceed without clicking on a button to indicate consent 
to the terms. 
A Shrink- Wrap Licences May Expand Property Rights in Information 
The danger of software producers using a combination of licensing and 
technology to expand their de facto rights in information at the expense of 
publicly available information is particularly associated with mass produced 
software and standard form licences. Contracts for customised software involve 
bargaining between the parties. The software producer will not necessarily be in 
a more powerful position than the purchaser. Consequently, if the licensee 
knows what his or her rights are under intellectual property law, the producer of 
customised software will not necessarily be able to acquire stronger rights in the 
information. Further, customised software is not generally publicly available. 
Thus, any extension of the software producer's rights in the information would 
only be at the expense of the licensee, not the public. 
25 This is, of course, a simplification of the situation. Non-customised software packages may be 
heavily customised for a particular client. The line may perhaps be drawn by considering 
how much customisation was required and whether there was a negotiated contract. 
26 It may also be printed on the outside of boxes containing computer software, included somewhere 
in the box or shrink-wrapped with the owner's manual accompanying the software. 
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In contrast, mass market software is sold with a non-negotiated licence that is 
written by the software producer. The licensor is invariably in a more powerful 
position than the licensee. This makes the licensing of mass market software a 
much more potent tool for extending software producers' property rights in 
information. These licences typically limit many uses that would not be 
proscribed by copyright law. While some of these restrictions may be necessary 
to create rivalry, this is not always the case. For example, there may be 
restrictions on reverse engineering, bans on adverse comment on the software, 
and restrictions on use to particular items of hardware or a particular site, even 
if the extent of actual use does not change. Competition between producers does 
not appear to effectively limit this. Thus, despite the apparent public availability 
of these information products, the producer has effectively limited the public's 
ability to make use of them in ways not proscribed by intellectual property law. 
B Are Shrink- Wrap Licences Enforceable? 
The use of restrictive licence terms in mass market software licences is only 
problematic if the licences are enforceable. Despite being used world wide, the 
enforceability of shrink-wrap licences has often been doubted by academic 
commentators. 27 Under black letter contract law, the terms of a contract must be 
known before the contract is concluded. 28 Many shrink-wrap licences are not 
capable of being read until after the money and software have changed hands. 
Consequently, the terms come too late to be part of the contract. Another 
problem is privity of contract. Most retail software is sold through a distributor. 
Therefore, it is hard to fit the software producer into the contract as a party who 
can enforce the licence terms. Nevertheless, recent cases have found shrink-
27 "Are Shrink-wrap Licences Legally Effective?" (1997) 10 Australian Intellectual Property Law 
Bulletin 91; David Bainbridge Software Copyright law (2 ed, Butterworths, London, 1994) 
180. 
28 John F Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Comract in New "Zealand (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1997) 189-191. 
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wrap licences to be enforceable. 29 There have also been moves to validate 
shrink-wrap licences by statute. 30 
C Is Mass Produced Software "Goods"? 
It is unclear whether transactions in mass market software are sales of goods or 
something else. This issue is important because the categorisation will 
determine what body of law will apply to the transaction. If shrink-wrap 
licences are enforceable, categorisation of the transactions as sales of goods will 
provide consumer protections that software producers may not contract out of. 
If shrink-wrap licences are not enforceable, the categorisation will determine 
which set of contractual default rules will apply to the transaction. 
This is particularly important with regard to warrantees. For example, the 
provision of software (particularly without a physical medium) could be 
categorised as purely a licence to use the intellectual property. An implied 
warrantee with regard to a pure licence would probably be limited to a 
warrantee that the producer owns the intellectual property and will not sue for 
use. On the other hand, such a transaction could also be categorised as the sale 
of a good (particularly if the software was supplied on a physical medium). 
Such a transaction would be subject to an implied warrantee of merchantability 
and fitness for its purpose. 31 
29 Pro-CD v Z,eidenburg (1996) 86 F 3d 1447 (7th Cir); Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe 
Systems (Europe) Ltd [1996] 5 FSR 367 (Scottish Court of Session, Outer House). 
30 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act, LA REV STAT ANN §§ 51:1961-1966 (West 
1987 & Supp. 1995) [Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act]; Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act, ILL REV STAT Ch 29 para 801-808 (1986) (repealed) [Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act (repealed)]. 
3
' Sale of Goods Act 1908, sl6. 
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IV THE CASE LAW ON SHRINK-WRAP LICENCES 
A Canada 
In North American Systems hops Ltd v King, 32 a computer program was 
distributed inside a shrink-wrapped booklet. A copyright symbol and a licence 
agreement were placed on the inside cover of the booklet. They were not 
visible to the purchaser at the time of purchase. Judge Veit held that 
copyrighted computer programs may be sold subject to restrictive conditions. 33 
However, in an over-the-counter sale, where no explicit restrictions are brought 
to the notice of the purchaser, there is an implied granting of permission to the 
purchaser to do whatever the purchaser wished with the program. 34 
The Judge's reasoning was based on a number of patent cases in which patent 
holders had tried to restrict the use of patented products after sale. 35 These cases 
showed that patented articles were different from normal goods in that 
restrictions may be imposed on the use of these goods when they were sold. 
Those restrictions ran with the goods. The Judge found that copyright goods 
belong to a similar category. 
However, as with patented goods, a sale of copyright goods without explicit 
restrictions on use vested full rights to use the goods. This was especially so in 
the case of over-the-counter sale of computer software because it cannot be used 
without being copied at least once into the computer's memory. As the plaintiff 
did not bring home to the defendant that there were any restrictions on use at the 
time of purchase, and as no implied restrictions were necessary to the sale, the 
defendant was impliedly granted the right to do whatever he wished with the 
program. 
32 North American Syscemshops Ltd v King 68 Alta LR (2d) 145 (QB). 
33 North American Syscemshops Led v King above n 32, 154. 
34 North American Syscemshops Ltd v King above n 32, 155. 
35 Beus v Willmou (1891) LR 6 Ch 239 (CA); Incandescent Gas Lighc Co v Camelo (1895) 12 RPC 
262 (QBD); Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 (HL); Nac Phonograph Co of 
Auscralia led v Menck [191 l] AC 336 (PC). 
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1 Critique 
This case recognised a right for software producers to limit the use of their 
software as long as the restriction is brought to the attention of the purchaser at 
the time of sale. However, the right was based on an analogy with patented 
goods, rather than the recognition of a need for software owners to recreate 
rivalry in order to efficiently market their products. The right of patentees to 
restrict the use of patented products is based on the statutory monopoly granted 
the patentee to use or vend the patented item. However, because the 
enforcement of these rights would prevent the purchaser of a patented product 
from using it, the law assumes that a sale without explicit restrictions grants all 
rights to use the article. 
Copyright, in contrast, only grants the author the right to control certain uses of 
the intellectual property. 36 All other uses are available to the purchaser of a 
copyrighted product. The Judge did not discuss these differences between 
copyright and patent products. The breach of licence in question, copying the 
program onto several computer hard disks, was a copyright infringement. Thus, 
the Judge may have merely meant that the copyright owner may, by explicit 
notice, restrict copyright uses only. This certainly seems the only acceptable 
extension of the patent analogy to copyright works. 
Allowing the software producer to contractually restrict copyright uses only 
would not appear to allow the creation of de facto property rights in 
information. Nevertheless, it does potentially grant the producer power to 
control all uses, as the computer program must be copied to be used. Thus, 
non-copyright restrictions may be linked to copyright restrictions in a single take 
it or leave it contract. The Judge noted that a purchaser could not use the 
software without copying it but did not discuss the implications of this. 
36 Copyright Act 1994, s 16, is a New Zealand example of this. 
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The Judge noted that the manner of selling the software, with no warning of the 
licence inside the booklet, was no longer current. He did not comment on 
whether a visible shrink-wrap licence or visible notice of a licence would be 
enforceable. This has led commentators to state that it is unclear whether 
shrink-wrap licences are enforceable in Canada. 37 
B Singapore 
In Aztech Systems Pte Ltd v Creative Technology Ltd, 38 the High Court of 
Singapore dealt in passing with a shrink-wrap licence. The case concerned 
sound cards produced by the defendant that were sold to the public together with 
a package of ancillary software. The plaintiffs purchased a copy of the sound 
cards and software. They then developed sound cards designed to be compatible 
with the defendant's sound cards. In doing so, they studied the defendant's 
sound card while running the software. This necessarily involved reproducing 
the program in the memory of a PC. The defendant alleged that this infringed 
its copyright in the computer program. 
The Judge found that the use was fair dealing for the purposes of private study. 
However, the software apparently contained a shrink-wrap licence in the manual 
restricting such use. The Judge discussed the issue in terms of whether a 
copyright owner, having sold a copyright product, has any right to restrict the 
use of the product by the purchaser. Like Judge Viet, he drew an analogy with 
the sale of patented articles and concluded that a sale without restrictions granted 
the purchaser all rights to use the product. 
At no time up to the point of the purchase was the defendant's attention drawn to 
any limitations as to the use of the software. The limitations in the manual 
would only have come to its attention after the purchase. Thus, the purchaser of 
37 Sunny Randa "Reverse Engineering Computer Programs Under Canadian Copyright Law (1995) 
40 McGill Law Journal 621, footnote 87. 
38 Aztech Systems Pte Ltd v Creative Technology Ltd (1996] FSR 54 (HC). 
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the software was entitled to exercise the rights of ownership. These include 
using it, running it on as many PCs and as often as he pleases, studying it and 
experimenting with it, regardless of the fact that using it in this fashion involved 
making a copy of the software on the PC's memory. However, he cannot make 
and distribute copies of the software as that is not using it. 
The High Court's decision was reversed in the Court of Appeal. 39 The Court of 
Appeal pointed out that, because of the patent owners rights to control the use 
and re-sale of the patented article, it was necessary to imply a term that the 
patent owner had consented to use or re-sale in order to give business efficacy to 
the contract. This was not the case with a copyright article. Any terms which 
should be implied must be limited to those necessary to lend business efficacy to 
a contract, and that did not extend to implied consent to copying the program in 
order to make a competing product. 
1 Critique 
This case, like North American Systemshops Ltd v King, illustrates the black 
letter problem with shrink-wrap licences. Shrink-wrap licences are not 
enforceable because they are not brought to the attention of the purchaser until 
the contract is concluded. It also provides an interesting discussion of the 
extension of the patent implied licence principle to copyright works. Given that 
it is necessary for a software user to copy the copyrighted computer program in 
order to use the product, an implied licence to copy seems justified, at least to 
the extent required to make ordinary uses of the program. Whether this extends 
to an implied licence to make a competing product seems to depends on the 
court's attitude to the role of innovation in copyright policy. 
39 Creative Technology Ltd v Aztech Systems Pte Ltd [1997) I SLR 621 (CA). 
C USA 
The earliest cases in the USA held that purchasers could not be bound by shrink-
wrap licences. Mass market software transactions were treated as sales, 
effective at the point of purchase, not licences, and the "licence" in the box as 
an attempt to alter the terms of the contract without meaningful consent from the 
purchaser. 40 The Louisiana courts treated shrink-wrap licences as contracts of 
adhesion and therefore invalid. 41 Thus, the only rights the software producer 
retained in the software were those available under copyright law. However, in 
a recent 7th circuit decision, Pro-CD v Zeidenburg, 42 this trend has been 
reversed. 
Pro-CD produced a software telephone directory which it offered to the public 
for two different prices, the higher price allowing commercial use and the lower 
price allowing personal use. The defendant purchased a copy with a personal 
use licence for the lower price. He read the shrink-wrap licence and also had to 
proceed through an on-line version of the licence before accessing the software. 
The licence asked the user to return the software for a refund if he or she did not 
assent to the terms of the licence. 
Although aware that the terms of his licence forbade commercial use, the 
defendant proceeded make his copy available to the public on his website for a 
fee. He did not believe that the licence was enforceable and the telephone 
directory was not protected by copyright under United States law. 43 The Judge 
at first instance found for the defendant on the grounds that the licence was 
unenforceable as it was presented to the defendant after the formation of the 
contract. However, this decision was reversed on appeal. 
40 Step-Saver Dara Systems Inc. v \,fyse Technology (1991) 939 F 2d 91 (3d Cir); Arizona Retail Sys 
v Software Link (1993) 831 F Supp 759 (D Ariz). 
41 Vault Corp v Quaid Software Ltd (1987) 655 F Supp 750 (ED La), affd (1998) 847 F 2d 255 
(5th Cir). 
42 Pro-CD v 7.eidenburg (1996) 86 F 3d 1447 (7th Cir) [Pro-CD v 7.eidenburg]. 
43 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co (1990) 499 US 340. 
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1 Commercial importance of shrink-wrap licences 
The Court of Appeals held that computer software shrink-wrap licences are 
enforceable unless their terms are objectionable on grounds applicable to 
contracts in general. 44 In coming to this conclusion, the Court emphasised the 
commercial importance of the shrink-wrap licence. The telephone database was 
expensive to produce and maintain. The licence allowed the vendor to use price 
discrimination, selling the product for personal use at a low price and for 
commercial use at a much higher price. If the vendor could not limit use by 
contract, then it would have to sell at one price allowing for all uses. This 
would be bad for consumers as it would eliminate buying for personal use and, 
also, raise the single price above that currently charged for commercial use in 
order to make up for the lost personal use sales. 
The Court considered that standardisation of agreements was essential to a 
system of mass production and distribution. While the terms of an agreement 
must be known before the contract is concluded, the Court thought that this 
requirement had been met. The terms of the licence allowed the purchaser to 
return the software for a refund if he or she did not accept the terms. This 
allowed the Court to hold that the contract was not formed until the purchaser 
had had an opportunity to read the licence and indicate assent by using the 
software. The Court concluded that, as it was not practical to put the agreement 
on the outside of the box, then, notice on the outside, terms on the inside and a 
right of refund if the terms are unacceptable may be a means of doing business 
that is valuable to buyers and sellers alike. 
2 Private intellectual property rights 
The Court also had to consider whether the licence created rights equivalent to 
those created by the federal Copyright Act. If this was the case, then the rights 
created by the licence would be pre-empted by the Copyright Act and would be 
ineffective. 45 The Court noted that a copyright is a right against the world. 
Contracts, in contrast, generally only affect their parties, and so do not create 
exclusive rights. Someone who found a copy of the software on the street would 
not be bound by the shrink-wrap licence, but they would be by the law of 
copyright. 
The Court considered that terms and conditions offered by contract generally 
reflected private ordering, essential to the efficient functioning of markets . The 
point of the rule forbidding state law from pre-empting federal copyright law 
was to prevent States from substituting their own regulatory systems for those of 
the national government. It was not to interfere with private transactions in 
intellectual property. The Court did not think it prudent to adopt a rule that 
anything with the label "contract" was outside the pre-emption clause. 
However, the general enforcement of shrink-wrap licences of the kind in Pro-
CD did not pre-empt federal copyright law. 
3 Critique 
The judgment is valuable for the recognition it gives to the commercial 
importance of standard form contracts in the mass production and distribution of 
software. While it may be a legal fiction to say that the consumer agrees to the 
licence if he or she has an opportunity to read it (because consumers generally 
ignore them), this is no less true than for other products sold with standard form 
contracts. In particular, the judgment recognises that licensing gives software 
producers the ability to tailor their product to different users, to the benefit of 
both producers and consumers. 
However, the Court failed to recognise the possibility of producers using shrink-
wrap licences to expand their rights in information to the detriment of public 
access to information. The argument that such contracts only bind the parties is 
44 Pro-CD v 'Zeidenburg above n 42, 1449. 
45 Copyright Act 17 USC s 30l (a) (1998). 
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erroneous. As was pointed out above, shrink-wrap licences enable the licensor 
to control the access of third parties to their software. Third parties must copy 
the software to "read it". The copyright status of the software means they 
cannot do this without the authorisation of the software producer. The licensee 
is invariably bound by the contract not to allow others to use his or her copy of 
the software. Thus, an enforceable shrink-wrap licence is, indeed, a right 
enforceable against the world. The Court's example of a stranger finding a copy 
of the software in the street and not being bound by the licence is unconvincing. 
People who find software lying in the street are a very small section of the 
world's population. 46 
The Court considered that the purpose of the copyright pre-emption section was 
to prevent the States from substituting their own regulatory systems for those of 
the national government, not to interfere in private contractual arrangements. 
However, if policy precludes the States from doing this, surely industry groups 
should also be precluded from effectively creating private de facto intellectual 
property rights in substitution for those of the national government. 
The ability of software producers to use licensing to create de facto intellectual 
property rights can be demonstrated by comparing Pro-CD to another American 
copyright case, Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co. 47 Feist also 
concerned a telephone directory, however, the Feist directory was a tangible, 
paper directory. The defendant in Feist had copied a telephone directory 
produced by the plaintiff in order to include the information in its own telephone 
directory. The plaintiff alleged that this was an infringement of its copyright. 
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's telephone directory was not 
sufficiently original to attract copyright. Therefore, the defendant (and others) 
could freely copy it. 
46 Perhaps shrink-wrap licences could be described as creating a property right good against all the 
world except strangers who find the software lying in the street! 
41 Feist Publications v Rural Telephone Service Co above n 43. 
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The database of electronic telephone directories in Pro-CD was also assumed not 
to be subject to copyright. 48 Nevertheless, the Court found for the plaintiff as it 
considered the licence an effective limitation on the defendant's ability to use the 
database. Thus, a change in the method of contracting has effectively given a 
property right in electronic telephone directories where a similar right does not 
exist with regard to the tangible paper equivalent. 
49 
D Scotland 
The effectiveness of shrink wrap licences was considered in the Scottish case of 
Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd.
50 Beta v Adobe 
involved a retail transaction. The defender (the end user) had ordered software 
off the pursuers (the retailer) by telephone. The software was delivered, 
however the defender decided it did not want it and returned it unopened. The 
software was packaged so as to indicate that it was subject to a strict end-user 
licence to the copyright owner (a third party). The packaging bore the words 
"opening the . . . software package indicates your acceptance of these terms and 
conditions" .51 The defenders contended that this gave them an absolute right to 
reject the package until they opened it. The pursuers contended that the contract 
for the supply of the software had been concluded and that the defenders were 
obliged to pay them the price of the software. 
1 A single complex product 
Lord Penrose began his analysis by identifying what it was the defenders sought 
to have supplied by the pursuers, that is, what was the subject of the contract? 
48 Of course, the computer program that enabled users to see the directory on the screen was 
copyrighted. 
49 On 9 October 1997, a bill was introduced into Congress which would create a property right in 
such collections of information: HR 2652 "Collections of Information Antipiracy Act". 
The bill was passed by the House of Representatives 8 May 1998 and is currently before the 
Senate. 
50 Beta Computers (Europe) Ltd v Adobe Systems (Europe) Ltd (1996) 5 FSR 367 (Scottish Court of 
Session, Outer House) [Beta v Adobe]. 
51 Beta v Adobe above n 50, 370. 
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He found that the subject of the contract was access to the third party's 
intellectual property in a medium which the defenders could use, and from 
which they could copy program material electronically into their hardware 
system. The order was not an order for the supply of disks or an order for the 
supply of information: "The subject of the contract was a complex product 
comprising the medium and the manifestation within it . . . of the intellectual 
property of the author ... in the form of the program material contained". 
52 
2 Not a sale - a sui generis contract 
A contract for the sale of software must, if it is to have business efficacy, make 
available to the purchaser both the medium and the right to access and use the 
software. However, the scheme of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(UK) makes it impossible to legitimately supply the medium with the facility to 
access program material contained in it, independently of the authority of the 
owner of the copyright. Lord Penrose rejected an analogy with the sale of a 
printed book, as a book merely needs to be read, not copied. With a book there 
are no limitations on accessing the information which affect readers generally 
and which are inherent in the medium. However, with software there is no 
possibility of accessing the information without copyright infringement. He 
concludes that: 53 
the supply of proprietary software for a pnce 1s a contract sui 
generis which may involve elements of nominate contracts such as 
sale, but would be inadequately understood if expressed wholly in 
terms of any of the nominate contracts. 
52 Beta v Adobe above n 50, 375. 
53 Beta v Adobe above n 50, 377. 
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3 A single contract 
Lord Penrose rejected the idea that the transaction consisted of two contracts, 
one between the purchaser and supplier and one between the purchaser and the 
copyright owner. He considered that there was a single contract between the 
supplier and the purchaser and that it was an essential feature of the contract that 
the supplier undertake to make available to the purchaser both the medium and 
the right of access to the copyright material. 
He did not think that it was possible to hold that a second contract came into 
existence between the copyright owner and the end user when the product was 
unwrapped. This was because the supplier would not be bound by such a 
contract, which would mean that the supplier's only obligation would be to 
supply the disk. This would leave purchasers with a product they could not use 
unless they accepted the copyright owner's conditions. Or, if the copyright 
owner could not enforce the restrictions, would undermine the ability of the 
copyright owner to control the permitted use of his or her intellectual property. 
Neither of these results pleased the judge. He thought that the interests of the 
industry as a whole in the efficient and sensible management of transactions 
required that effect should be given to the licence conditions if possible. 
Lord Penrose concludes that, given the importance of the purchaser's ability to 
legitimately use the software, the contract could not be properly analysed 
without acknowledging the need to ensure the consent of the copyright owner to 
the intended use of his property . Where the conditions of such use were not 
within the control of the supplier but must be granted by the owner, and where 
there were well-established routines for determining what those requirements 
were, consensus could not be achieved the until the conditions were produced 
and accepted by the parties. That point could not come earlier in this case than 
the stage at which the supplier, deriving the material from the owner, tendered 
to the purchaser an expression of those conditions which the purchaser might 
accept or reject before becoming bound to the contract. 
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Lord Penrose's analysis leaves one black letter contract problem. The licensor 
is a third party to the contract between the supplier and the purchaser and 
therefore has no standing to enforce the terms of the licence. The Judge solves 
the problem by applying the Scottish law doctrine of ius quaesitium tertio. This 
doctrine protects third party interests in a contract if the terms of the contract 
indicate that it was an object of the contract to benefit the third party. 
4 Critique 
Lord Penrose recognised the umque nature of software transactions and the 
necessity of focusing on the "thing of value" to the parties when analysing the 
transaction. His conclusion that mass market retail software transactions are sui 
generis contracts for a complex product enables him to avoid the trap of 
squeezing the transaction into familiar, but unsuitable, contractual forms. 
Nevertheless, he still has to fit the transaction into the general rules of contract 
law; that is, the licence terms must be known before the contract is concluded 
and there must be privity of contract. 
His analysis of the contract of supply as being a contract for useable software 
neatly solves the timing problem. Further reasons for finding the licence to be 
part of the contract between the user and supplier are that it is easier for a user 
to obtain a refund off the retailer and the difficulty of finding consideration for a 
contract between user and producer. 
54 
However, the Judge does not refer to these factors. His reasoning centres 
around the fact that if the licence was to form a new contract between software 
producer and user, the supplier's only obligation would be to supply the disk. 
Then either the user would be obliged to accept and pay for a disk it could not 
use, or, if the licence was ineffective, the copyright owners' ability to control 
their intellectual property would be undermined. Oddly, Lord Penrose does not 
54 Several commentators have pointed out that purchasing the software would be past consideration 
at this point. See, for example, Gary Lea "The Impossible Intangible: Shrinkwrap Software 
Revisited" (1996) 1 Communications Law 238, 240. 
26 
refer to the patent cases, discussed above, which hold that the sale of patented 
items (and by analogy copyright items) without restriction grants all uses that are 
part of the exercise of ownership. 
The mechanism whereby Lord Penrose validates the licence is rather 
idiosyncratic, ius quaesitium tertio being a civil law doctrine which is not 
available at common law. The problem with using this doctrine is that, while it 
would enable the licensor to enforce the licence terms against the licensee, it 
would not permit the licensee to enforce licence terms, for example warrantee 
provisions, against the licensor. The doctrine has been introduced into New 
Zealand by the Contracts (Privity) Act 1982. However, the same difficulty 
would arise if the Act were to be used to validate a shrink-wrap licence. Under 
the Act, a beneficiary of a contract can sue to enforce the terms made for its 
benefit. 55 However, the beneficiary itself cannot be sued. 
The Judge was aware of the commercial importance of shrink-wrap licences. 
Indeed, he states that he considers that the interests of the industry as a whole in 
the efficient and sensible management of transactions required that effect should 
be given to the conditions if possible. 
However, he does not consider the effect of shrink-wrap licences on the public 
information domain. That is not surprising as the case was limited to asking if 
the purchaser can return the software without payment. Yet, by finding that the 
licence terms form part of the contract between the supplier and the user and 
that they are enforceable by the software producer against the user, the judgment 
implicitly raises the question of what sort of licence terms should be 
enforceable. 
55 Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, s 4. 
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V THE SOFTWARE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF LOUISIANA AND 
ILLINOIS 
The cases that recognise shrink-wrap licences have had to fit them within the 
confines of classical contact law. As was demonstrated in Beta v Adobe, 
traditional doctrines may have to be stretched to accommodate transactions in 
intangible goods. The legislatures of Louisiana and Illinois have attempted to 
address the need for a specific contractual regime designed for mass market 
software sold with shrink-wrap licences. These States both enacted statutes 
which validated shrink-wrap licences. 56 These statutes provide an example of 
one form of legislative enforcement of shrink-wrap licences. It should be noted 
at this point that the Illinois statute has subsequently been repealed, as have 
several provisions of the Louisiana statute. 
The statutes were based on the same model bill and provided very similar 
schemes for enforceable shrink-wrap licences. Under these schemes, the shrink-
wrap packaging must include a conspicuously visible notice, stating that use of 
the software or opening the sealed packages will constitute acceptance of the 
terms of the accompanying licence agreement. 57 The purchaser must have the 
option of returning the unopened software for a refund. 58 
The statutes also provided a list of specific provisions that would be enforceable 
in conforming licences. 59 Under these provisions, the licensor may retain title in 
the copy. If the licensor retains title, purchasers are conclusively presumed to 
accept licence terms prohibiting any copying, limiting the purposes for which 
copies may be made, prohibiting the right to modify, adopt, translate, reverse 
engineer, decompile, disassemble, or create derivative works from the software, 
56 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act above n 30; Illinois Software Enforcement Act, 
(repealed) above n 30. 
57 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act above n 30, §§ 51: 1963(1); Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act (repealed) above n 30, para 803, s 3(1) . 
58 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act above n 30, §§ 51: 1963(4); Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act (repealed) above n 30, para 803, s 3(4). 
59 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act above n 30, §§ 51: 1964; Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act (repealed) above n 30, para 804, s 4. 
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prohibitions on the subsequent transfer, assignment, sale or other disposition of 
the copy, and prohibitions on the use of the software on more than one computer 
or by more than one user at the same time. 60 
These statutes were intended to provide certainty as to the enforceability of 
shrink-wrap licences. This would have had the benefit of ensuring that software 
providers could introduce rivalry into the market and practice price 
discrimination. However, the statutes would also have allowed the contractual 
extension of the software producers intellectual property rights to a considerable 
degree. Many of the terms that were specifically validated covered activities for 
which there was no apparent commercial need, such as prohibitions on 
subsequent sale of the copy. Other possible restrictions, such as the prohibition 
on reverse engineering, could have had anti-competitive effects. Although such 
restrictions might have been commercially necessary in some circumstances, 
there was no onus on the producer to demonstrate that this was the case. 
As noted above, these statutes were not successful. Several provisions of the 
Louisiana statute were struck down by because they were found to pre-empt 
federal copyright law. 61 The Illinois statute, which would have been subject to 
the same criticisms, has subsequently been repealed. 
VI ARTICLE 2B OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
A General 
Shrink-wrap licences are part of a larger revolution in commercial transactions 
in digital information. The United States has responded to this revolution by 
seeking to develop the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) to provide a suitable 
framework for such transactions. The UCC is not a statute. It is a model 
60 Louisiana Software License Enforcement Act above n 30, §§ 51: 1964; Illinois Software 
Enforcement Act (repealed) above n 30, para 804, s 4. 
61 Vault Corp v Quaid Software Ltd above n 41. 
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commercial code which the state legislatures may adopt or not, as they wish. 
The UCC has been adopted, with some minor variations, by all the 50 states , 
thus providing uniformity in state commercial law. The UCC strongly supports 
the concept of freedom of contract. However, in order to facilitate commercial 
transactions, it provides a set of default rules to apply in the absence of 
contractual agreement. It also provides a small number of mandatory rules . 
The UCC was created in the 1950's. It is based on the sale of goods which was 
the foundation of the economy of that time. However , transactions in digital 
information are based on rights to use information. A new Article 2B is being 
drafted which will apply to transactions in digital information. 62 
B The "licensing" of "information" 
Article 2B applies to any transaction that creates a software contract, 63 computer 
database access contract or licence of rights in information. 64 It also applies to 
any agreement to provide support for, maintain, or modify information related 
to such a contact. 65 It does not apply to the licensing of patents, trade marks or 
similar types of information, which have their own fields of law. 66 
The paradigmatic transaction of Article 2B is licensing, which allows the 
information producer to control the licensee 's access to the information. Article 
2B defines "license" as: 67 
a contract that authorizes access to or use of information or of 
informational rights and expressly limits the contractual rights or 
62 National Conference of Commissioners on Unifo rm State Laws "Uni fo rm Commercial Code 
Article 28: Licenses" draft of 1 August 1998, 6-7, which can be found at 
< http ://www .law. upenn.edu/bll/ucl/ucc2b/2b898.htm > ["Article 2B"] . 
63 Except where the software is contained in another product and is incidental to the transaction. 
64 "Article 2B " above n 62, s 103 . 
65 "Article 2B " above n 62, s 103 . 
66 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 104. 
67 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 102(28). 
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permissions granted, expressly prohibits, limits, or controls uses , or 
expressly grants less than all informational rights in the information. 
A contract may be a license ... whether or not the contract transfers 
title to a copy .... 
Any law regulating information will have significant free speech implications. 
In recognition of this, Article 2B distinguishes between information, "data, text, 
images, sounds, mask works or works of authorship", 68 and informational 
content, which refers to the information that the user perceives when using the 
information. For example, with regard to an encyclopaedia software product, 
the computer program running it would be information while the information 
displayed on the computer screen would be informational content. 
Article 2B also distinguishes between rights to information created by contract 
and rights created by law, which it terms "informational rights" . 69 
The Article covers the formation and terms of contracts , the formation of 
contracts electronically, construction of contracts , interpretation, warranties , 
transfer of interests and rights, performance and remedies . As part of their 
project, the drafters have tackled the issue of shrink-wrap licences . They 
endorse shrink-wrap licences as long as a certain procedure is followed . 
C Shrink-Wrap Licences Validated 
1 Mass market transactions 
Article 2B has developed a new concept of the "mass market transaction". 
70 
The purpose of the mass market classification is to provide a suitable regime for 
low value, routine and anonymous transactions for information in pre-packaged 
68 "Article 2B " above n 62, s 102(24). 
69 "Article 2B " above n 62, s 102(27). 
70 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 102(32). 
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form, that occur in a retail market open to the general public. Consumer 
transactions on the Internet are also included. 
A mass market transaction means a consumer transaction or any other 
transaction in information or informational rights directed to the general public 
as a whole under substantially the same terms for the same information with an 
end-user licensee. A transaction other than a consumer transaction is a mass-
market transaction only if the licensee acquires the information or informational 
rights in a retail market transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with 
an ordinary transaction in that market. A transaction other than a consumer 
transaction is not a mass-market transaction if it is: 
a contract for redistribution 
a contract for public performance or public display of a copyrighted 
work 
a transaction m which the information is customised or otherwise 
specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee other than minor 
customisation using a capability of the information intended for that 
purpose 
a site licence 
an access contract 
2 Mass market licences 
Mass market transactions are accompanied by mass market licences. A mass-
market licence is defined as "a standard form that is prepared for and used in a 
mass-market transaction". 71 
71 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 102(31). 
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3 Manifesting assent 
Contracts may be formed by the manifestation of assent. 72 A person manifests 
assent if they intentionally engage in conduct that they know, or have reason to 
know, will indicate acceptance to the other party. The person must have had 
knowledge of the licence or term they are assenting to, or had an opportunity to 
review it before engaging in the affirmative conduct. 
4 Opportunity to review 
A person has an opportunity to review a licence or term only if it is made 
available in a manner that ought to call it to the attention of a reasonable person, 
and that permits review. 73 An example would be a click-wrap software licence 
which asks the licensee to indicate acceptance of the licence by clicking on an 
assent button, while giving the licensee an opportunity to review the licence via 
a hypertext link. As the licensee has an opportunity to review the licence, he or 
she can indicate assent by clicking on the assent button, regardless of whether 
they review the licence or not. 
A manifestation of assent may be proved in any manner. This includes showing 
that a procedure existed by which a person must have engaged in conduct that 
manifested assent in order to proceed further in the use he or she made of the 
information. For example, a licensor could show that it was not possible to 
access their software without going through a series of screens that required the 
licensee to click assent to the terms of the licence. 
72 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 111. 
73 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 112. 
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5 Adoption of mass market licence terms 
A party can adopt the terms of a mass market licence by manifesting assent to 
them either before or during the initial performance, use of, or access to the 
information. 74 
6 Licensee protections 
Article 2B provides a number of protections for mass market licensees. A term 
does not become part of the contract if it is unconscionable or if it conflicts with 
terms to which the parties have expressly agreed. 75 If there is a legal 
requirement of assent to a particular term, there must be an opportunity to 
review the term and the manifestation of assent must relate specifically to the 
term. 76 
Further, the potential licensee has a right to back out of the transaction without 
loss (other than inconvenience) if he or she does not like the terms of the licence 
once they are known. If a party does not have an opportunity to review a mass 
market licence before having to pay for it, they have a right to a refund on 
returning all copies of the information or destroying them pursuant to 
instructions. 77 They also have a right to reimbursement for reasonable expenses 
associated with returning or destroying the information. 78 If the information had 
to be installed on a computer to review the licence and the installation damages 
the computer or information on the computer, the purchaser is entitled to 
compensation for any foreseeable loss caused by the installation, including any 
reasonable expenses incurred in restoring the computer to its previous 
condition. 79 
74 "Article 2B" above n 62 , s 208 . 
75 "Article 2B" above n 62 , s 208(a). 
76 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 111. 
77 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 208(b)( l ). 
78 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 208(b)(2). 
79 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 208(b)(3). 
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7 Contracts involving publishers, distributors and end users 
One topic that had concerned commentators on shrink-wrap licences was the 
issue of privity of contract in situations where there was a producer, a 
distributor and an end user . If the contract for the sale of the software was 
between the suppler and the end user , how could the producer be a party? 
Article 2B deals with the three party relationship typical to shrink-wrap licensing 
by providing for three separate but linked relationships . 80 
The contract between the end user and the distributor is conditional on the end 
user 's agreement to the publisher 's licence. 81 If the end user does not agree to 
the terms of the publisher's licence, the end user has a right to a refund on 
return of the information to the distributor . 82 The distributor is not bound by the 
terms of, and does not receive the benefits of, an agreement between the 
publisher and the end user unless the distributor and end user adopt those terms 
as part of their agreement. 83 If an agreement provides for distribution of copies 
on a physical medium provided by the publisher, a distributor shall distribute the 
copies and documentation received from the publisher in the form as received 
and subject to any contractual term that the publisher provides for end users . 84 
A distributor that enters into a licence or software contract with an end user is a 
licensor of the end user for all purposes under the Article , including warranties , 
other performance obligations and remedies . 85 
80 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 617. 
81 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 617(b)(l ). This fo llows the reasoning in Beta v Adobe. 
82 "Article 2B" above n 62 , s 617(b)(2). 
83 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 617(b)(3). 
84 "Article 2B " above n 62, s 617(c). 
85 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 617(d). 
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D Are All Terms Validated? 
Thus, Article 2B provides a scheme whereby software producers can ensure that 
their shrink-wrap licences will be valid as long as a certain procedure is 
followed. However, it is possible that certain terms in an otherwise valid 
shrink-wrap licence will not be enforceable. As was noted above, a term does 
not become part of the contract if it is unconscionable or if it conflicts with 
terms to which the parties have expressly agreed . There are also more specific 
limitations. A term that provides for an exclusive judicial forum will not be 
enforced if the choice is unreasonable and unjust. 86 Article 2B also provides a 
number of consumer protections that would extend to the majority of shrink-
wrap licence transactions. 
However, the larger question of whether, or to what extent, terms that extend 
the rights of licensors in information are permissible, is left in the air. The 
drafters of 2B claim that the article is neutral when it comes to policy questions 
regarding the relationship between contract law and intellectual property law. 
87 
They consider that article 2B merely provides a generic contract law framework 
to bring to modern form the existing network of United States common law, 
statute and general industry practice. It does not change the law with regard to 
copyright. 
However, this argument ignores the fact that the interaction of copyright with 
intangible forms of intellectual property has the potential to change the law of 
copyright in a de facto manner. The drafters distinguish between a contract, 
which defines rights between parties to the agreement, and a property right, 
which creates rights against all the world. This distinction was discussed in part 
IV above, and shown to be invalid with regard to intangible intellectual 
property. 
86 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 108. 
87 "Article 2B" above n 62, Introduction. 
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Article 28 further strengthens the licensor's hand by permitting the licensor to 
enforce contractual restrictions with electronic self help. A licensor may use an 
electronic restraint88 if the licence agreement includes a term authorising its use, 
or the restraint merely restricts uses that have not been contracted for, or the 
restraint prevents use when the contract terminates. 89 The licensor is also 
entitled to prevent continued use of the licensed information upon cancellation of 
the contract for breach. 90 It is not clear if this extends to electronic self help. 
Article 28 has been heavily criticised for its validation of mass market 
licences. 91 Critics suggest that anti-competitive and anti-social effects are likely 
to ensue when the heightened technological power of intellectual property 
licensors to control access to information and to impose restrictions on end-users 
of software is combined with the validation of non-negotiated mass market 
licences. 92 Indeed, the history of software protection indicates that when 
companies with market power use shrink-wrap or other mass market licences, 
they are strongly tempted to impose anti-competitive conditions. 93 
As a result of these criticisms, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) has proposed a motion which would allow a 
court to refuse to enforce licence terms which were contrary to public policies 
relating to innovation, competition and free expression. 94 The motion would 
insert a new section 110: 
88 A " restraint" means as a program, code, device, or similar electronic or physical limitation that 
restricts use of information . 
89 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 310. 
90 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 715. 
91 See, for example, J .H. Reichman and Jonathan A. Franklin "Privately Legislated Intellectual 
Property Rights: The Limits of Article 2B of the UCC" Final Draft, last revised 10/4/98, 
Presented at ; Intellectual Property & Contract Law in the Information Age: The Impact of 
Article 2B of the UCC on the Future of Transactions in Information & Electronic 
Commerce, April 23-25, 1998, Berkeley, CA, which can be found at 
<http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Law/faculty/reichman.html > (last modified 24 August 1998) 
["Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights"]. 
92 "Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights" above n 91, 
93 "Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights " above n 91, 28. 
94 The NCCUSL and the American Law Institute must both approve the final draft of the Article. 
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Section 2B-110 IMPERMISSIBLE CONTRACT OR TERM. 
(a) If a court as a matter of law finds the contract or any term of the 
contract to have been unconscionable or contrary to public policies 
relating to innovation, competition, and free expression at the time it 
was made, the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the contract without the impermissible term, or it may so 
limit the application of any impermissible term as to avoid any 
unconscionable or otherwise impermissible result. 
(b) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
term thereof may be unconscionable or impermissible under this 
section the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
present evidence as to the contract's or term's commercial setting, 
purpose and effect and the extent to which the contract or term 
resulted from the actual informed affirmative negotiations of the 
parties to aid the court in making the determination. 
If this proposal is accepted , it will enable Article 2B to capture the benefits of 
standardised licensing but avoid placing too much power in the hands of the 
software producers . Copyright owners will be able to tailor their product to 
particular markets, but will have to justify any extension of their rights in 
information beyond those granted by intellectual property law. The courts will 
be able to balance the public benefits of mass market licensing against the public 
interest in education, science , research, technological development and the 
preservation of competition. 
E Does 2B Treat Software as a Good? 
As well as validating mass market licences , Article 2B provides default rules for 
the contract from formation through to cancellation . The particular rule that is 
applied to a particular type of transaction depends, in a large part, on whether 
the transaction looks more like a service, a good, or a pure licence. 95 The rules 
that Article 2B would apply to mass market transactions are, to a large extent, 
based on rules for the sale of goods. This is appropriate, given the similarity 
between the transactions. However, Article 2B also allows for variation where 
necessary; for example, the rules for transfer of title depend on whether a 
physical or electronic copy is delivered. 
1 Duration of contract 
The general default rule on duration of contract is that the contract is subject to 
termination at will on reasonable notice. 96 However, duration is perpetual in a 
software contract that transfers ownership of a copy or delivery of a copy for a 
fee which is fixed at or before delivery of the copy. 97 Thus, shrink-wrap 
licences are perpetual, unless they explicitly state otherwise. This makes them 
look very much like a sale, with the licence a device to control use of the 
information. 
2 Warranties 
Warranty rules also depend very much on whether a transaction looks like a sale 
of goods or a service contract or a pure licensing of information. Mass market 
computer programs resemble functional products and so an implied warranty 
which focuses on result and merchantabilty is appropriate. Section 403 provides 
for an implied warrantee that a delivered computer program and any physical 
medium on which it is delivered are merchantable98 if the licensor is a merchant 
95 However, the drafters of 2B reject an approach strictly based on whether the court characterises a 
transaction as involving a good or not. The drafters consider that distinction to be unreliable 
in relation to information transactions. 
96 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 308(1). 
97 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 308(2). 
98 To be merchantable, a computer program and any physical medium on which it is delivered must: 
(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; (2) be fit for the 
ordinary purposes for which it is distributed; (3) in the case of multiple copies, consist of 
copies that are, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality, and 
quantity, within each unit and among all units involved; (4) be adequately contained, 
39 
with respect to computer programs of that kind. Implied warrantees may be 
disclaimed or modified in the contract; however, in a mass market transaction, 
language that disclaims or modifies an implied warranty must be conspicuous. 99 
Modifying a copy of a computer program, other than by using a capability of the 
program intended for that purpose in the ordinary course, invalidates any 
warrantees regarding the performance of the modified copy. 100 A modification 
occurs if a licensee alters code in, deletes code from, or adds code to, the 
computer program. Because of the complexity of software systems, changes 
may cause unanticipated results. It would not be fair to burden the licensor with 
liability for these results. 
Mass market software may also contain informational content. The supply of 
informational content to the public is not subject to any warranty of accuracy. 101 
Such a warranty would chill the free flow of information. This parallels the 
treatment of informational content in tangible information goods such as 
newspapers, books etc. However, where there is a special relationship of 
reliance (not the case with mass market software), an implied warrantee of 
reasonable care in compiling the information is created. 102 
3 Transfer of rights and interests 
Title to a copy depends on the contract. In the absence of a contractual 
specification, title to a copy on disk passes with physical delivery, while title to 
an electronically delivered copy passes at the time and place at which the 
licensor completed its obligations with respect to delivery of the copy. 103 
packaged, and labelled as the agreement may require; and (5) conform to the promises or 
affirmations of fact made on the container or label, if any. 
99 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 406(b)(6) . 
100 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 407. 
101 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 404(b)(2). 
102 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 404(a). 
103 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 50 I. 
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Information transactions often raises issues of confidentiality. Section 502 
specifies that transfers of contractual interests are subject to protecting any 
confidential information that may be involved in the transaction. Likewise, to 
protect the licensor's interest in the information, financiers interests may not be 
enforced without the licensors permission. 104 These obligations survive the 
contract. However, confidentiality issues are not likely to arise in relation to 
mass market software. 
4 Performance 
Tender of performance entitles a party to acceptance of performance. Many 
licences for information create a continuing relationship with on-going 
commitments. This makes the perfect performance rule associated with the sale 
of goods unsuitable. Thus, the general rule is that a party may refuse 
performance only for a material breach. The delivery of a non conforming copy 
only requires the party in breach to promptly and in good faith make an effort to 
cure. 105 However, delivery of a non-conforming copy in a mass market 
transaction entitles the licensee to cancel. 106 Rules for tender of delivery of a 
copy are based on whether a physical medium is involved or whether delivery is 
electronic. 107 Risk of loss of copies also varies according to how a copy is 
delivered. 108 A concept of transfer of possession or control is used as the 
general standard for when risk of loss passes. 
104 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 503. 
105 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 606. 
106 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 609(b). 
107 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 607. 
108 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 623. 
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VII SHRINK- WRAP LICENCES IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Shrink- Wrap Licences Probably Not Enforceable 
Contract law in New Zealand is not codified as it has been in the United States . 
Contracts are subject to a number of general statutes that apply regardless of 
subject matter or type of transaction. These include the Consumer Guarantees 
Act 1993, Contracts (Privity) Act 1982, Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979, Fair Trading Act 1986 and Illegal Contracts 
Act 1970. In addition, contracts for the sale of goods are subject to the Sale of 
Goods Act 1908 . Contracts are also governed by a wealth of case law. 
There are no New Zealand cases on the validity of shrink-wrap licences . 
However, it is likely that they would be held to be invalid . While shrink-wrap 
licences vary , generally the purchaser only has an opportunity to read the terms 
of the licence after purchasing the software. A New Zealand court is likely to 
apply black letter contract law and say that the terms come to late too be part of 
the contract. 109 In retail transactions, which constitute the majority of shrink-
wrap sales, there is the additional problem of privity of contract. 
B Would a New Zealand Court Treat Shrink- Wrap Software as a Sale of 
Goods? 
I consider that it is likely that a New Zealand court would treat a mass market 
software transaction as a sale of goods with an implied licence from the 
copyright owner to copy the software to the extent necessary to use the product. 
However, the only New Zealand case to consider whether software is a good has 
taken a different view. In Case T28 , 
110 Judge Barber had to consider whether 
the sale of a business package, which included computer programs and software, 
was the sale of a good or goods, for the purposes of the Goods and Services Tax 
109 An analogy may be drawn with cases such as Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd [1971] 2 QB 
163 and Olley v Marlborough Coun Ltd [1949] 1 KB 532. 
110 Case T28 (1997) 18 NZTC 8,197 (DC). 
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Act 1985. The Act states that: "Goods means all kinds of personal or real 
property; but does not include choses in action or money" . 111 
The computer programs in Case T28 were originally written by one of the 
vendors for use in his pharmacy business. They had been adapted by the vendor 
for the diagnosis of soil, using the vendor's extensive knowledge of soil 
properties. In his analysis, Judge Barber distinguished between the software 
medium (the hard drive), the computer programs and the information on soil 
properties. 112 He noted that it was not disputed that any physical item on which 
information is stored is a good. However, the consideration in the case was not 
for the physical medium, but for the knowledge and information stored on the 
physical medium. 
The sale of the computer programs and information on soil properties did not 
involve the transfer of any physical item. The computer programs were 
transferred as electrical impulses down a cable from the hard disk of one 
computer to another. The information on soil properties existed only in the 
vendors' heads at the time of sale. As the vendors were selling to a company 
which they owned, no transfer of the information was required. (The 
information appears to have been added to the computer programs at some later 
date). 
The Judge held that the computer programs and software were not goods 
because they were intellectual property in the form of "know-how" .
113 The 
Judge did not define "know-how" but seemed to be referring to trade secrets. 
"Know-how" was a form of information and there is no property in 
information. 114 The information on soil properties was also not a good for this 
reason. 
111 Goods and Services Tax Act 1985, s 12(2). 
112 Case T28 (1997) above n I 10, 8,203. Judge Barber's distinction between the computer programs 
and the data parallel the Article 2B definitions of information and informational content. 
11 3 Case T28 (1997) above n 110, 8,207. 
114 Case T28 (1997) above n I 10, 8,207 . 
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The agreement between the vendors and the company had transferred the 
copyright in the programs to the company. Judge Barber held that copyright is a 
chose in action and not a good. 115 He came to this conclusion on the basis of the 
description of "choses in action" in several authoritative texts. 116 However, he 
did not outline his reasoning. The Judge considered what the situation would be 
if the vendors did not claim copyright in the software or the data stored on the 
software medium. In this case, payment would be for the vendors' services in 
compiling the information. Thus , Judge Barber seems to consider that software 
consists of pure information in the form of know-how and (possibly) copyright. 
The Judge's conception of the computer programs and informational content as 
separate objects of sale seems to me incorrect in general, but understandable in 
these unusual circumstances, where they were, in fact, separate at the time of 
the sale. However, clearly his analysis would not apply to mass market 
software. A buyer who purchases an encyclopaedia on CD-ROM does not enter 
into two transactions. He or she is buying a single product. It would be 
impractical to treat the computer program and the informational content as 
separate objects of sale as they are inextricably bound together. A customer 
dissatisfied with the informational content could not return the information and 
keep the software. 
The Judge' s finding that the computer program was a chose in action and not a 
good was based on his characterisation of the program as information in the 
form of "know-how" or a trade secret. However , a computer program is 
fanctioning know-how. This matters. When users buy a software product, they 
are not interested in the information, which they probably cannot comprehend; 
they expect to buy a product that does a particular thing. The sale of a written 
copy of the source code of the program would not be the same as the sale of a 
11 5 Case T28 (1 997) above n 110, 8,207. 
116 Halsbury 's Laws of England, Volume 6, para I ; The Laws of New Zealand, in the_ Chapter 
"Chases in Action" Butterworths 1993; Personal Property by J Crossley Varnes, 4th 
Edition, Butterworths, 1967 pp 11- 13; Garrow and Gray Law Of Property in New Zealand 
5th Edition, Butterworths 1968 242 (as cited by the Judge). 
44 
copy of the program. Yet, under Judge Barber's analysis, it is. Case T28 
suggests that New Zealand courts are likely to find that shrink-wrap software 
transactions are indeed merely licences to use information. However, because 
of the level of the court and weaknesses in the Judge's reasoning, the case is not 
a strong authority. 
The English courts have also addressed the issue of whether licensed software is 
a good. In St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd, 117 
the defendant supplied the plaintiff with customised software licensed for the 
plaintiff's use. The software was defective and caused the plaintiff loss. The 
contract contained a clause limiting the defendant's liability in the event of such 
loss. However, the clause was not permissible under the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. The defendant argued that the contract fell outside the provisions of the 
Act as the software did not constitute goods. 
Scott Baker J, at first instance, found that software was goods within the Sale of 
Goods Act as, otherwise, it would be difficult to see what it could be. The 
definition of "good" in the Sale of Goods Act is practically identical to that in 
the New Zealand Act; "all personal chattels other than things in action and 
money" .118 
On appeal, it was not considered necessary to decide if software was goods in 
order to decide the case. However, Glidewell J considered the question obiter. 
He drew an analogy between an instruction manual and software on a physical 
medium such as a disk. He concluded that, as the instructions in a manual could 
not be separated into the intangible information and the tangible ink and paper, 
neither should the tangible disk and the software in it be so separated; together, 
they constituted goods. However, while the disk and program together were 
within the definition of goods in the Sale of Goods Act 1979, a computer 
program, of itself, was not. Thus the program in question, which had been 
117 St Albans City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] 4 All ER 481 (CA). 
118 Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK), s 62. 
placed directly onto the plaintiff's computer by an employee of the defendant, 
was not a "good". Therefore, there was no statutory implication of terms as to 
quality or fitness for purpose. 119 
The Supreme Court of New South Wales has also held that software embodied 
in a tangible medium is a good. 120 The sale of a computer system comprising 
both hardware and software was found to constitute a sale of goods within the 
New South Wales Sale of Goods Act 1923 under a definition practically identical 
to that in the New Zealand Act. 121 
The courts in the United States have also, in the main, rejected the argument that 
the physical medium may be severed from the intangible program with only the 
medium treated as a good. 122 Since 1983, American courts have tended to treat 
software as a good for sales, use and property tax purposes. 123 Draft Article 2B 
has also, in the main, devised rules for mass market software based on rules for 
the sale of goods. Although the drafters do not consider that licensing mass 
market software is the same thing as the sale of a good, they recognise that there 
are many similarities, particularly where the software is on a disk. 
Thus, a number of influential jurisdictions have come to the conclusion that 
software is a good, at least where it is embodied in a tangible physical medium. 
The New Zealand courts are likely to follow these cases. The finding in Case 
T28 may be distinguished because it did not involve software on a tangible 
medium. In any case, Judge Barber's reasoning is open to criticism. 
119 This finding was of no benefit to the defendant, however, as the judge proceeded to apply similar 
implied terms under the common law. 
120 Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computer/Sales Pty Ltd [1983] 2 NSWLR 48. 
121 Sale of Goods Act 1923 (NSW), s 5(1) states that "goods" includes (unless the context or subject 
matter otherwise require) all chattels personal other than things in actions and money. 
122 These cases are discussed in: Peter Dengate-Thrush "Can Bad Software be Goods?" (1997) 
NZIPJ 206 ["Can Bad Software be Goods?"). 
123 Comptroller of the Treasury v Equitable Trust Company (1983) 464 A 2d 248 (Md CA) cited in 
"Can Bad Software be Goods?" above n 122, 207. 
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I consider that mass market software transactions are also likely to be treated as 
sales. The licence is usually of perpetual duration, a single payment is made, 
and there is no further contact between the parties. Thus, the transaction looks, 
in most respects, very much like the sale of a good. Mass market transactions 
where the software is embodied in a disk would therefore be subject to the Sale 
of Goods Act 1908 and the Consumers Guarantees Act 1993. The Consumers 
Guarantees Act in particular will provide strong protects for purchasers, the 
majority of whom will be consumers. 
However, mass market software delivered directly over a wire without delivery 
of a physical medium would probably not be treated as the sale of a good. 
Scott-Baker J, at first instance in St Albans, seems to be the only judge for 
whom the lack of a physical medium for the information appears not to be an 
insurmountable obstacle. However, as Lord Penrose pointed out in Beta v 
Adobe, legal analysis of contracts should focus on matters of importance to 
parties, that is the software and the ability to use it, rather than matters of no 
significance to them, such as method of delivery. There is no significant reason 
for treating a transaction in which mass market software is delivered over a wire 
any differently from a transaction in which it is delivered in a physical medium. 
The only exception would be that different default rules concerning delivery may 
be appropriate. 
Transactions for mass market software that do not involve a physical medium 
are likely to be conducted electronically; that is, the offer, acceptance and 
delivery will take place over the Internet. Such electronic transactions raise 
many issues that are not dealt with by current contract law. However, this is an 
issue of general concern and is not limited to the purchase of mass market 
software. The development of rules for electronic commerce is currently being 
investigated by national and international bodies. 
124 
124 A report by the Law Commission on electronic commerce is due to be published in early 
October, 1998. 
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VIII WHAT SHOULD NEW ZEALAND DO? 
Shrink-wrap licences are beneficial in that they allow software produc
ers to 
create rivalry with regard to their products. As Pro-CD demonstrate
d, 
enforceable restrictions on the uses a software user may make of a p
roduct 
allows price discrimination which is beneficial to producer and consumer
 alike . 
Further, standardisation of agreements is common with respect to standa
rdised 
goods , offering the benefits of reduced transaction costs and inc
reased 
efficiency. I suggest that New Zealand should adopt some means of legiti
mising 
shrink-wrap licences . An examination of the limited case law on so
ftware 
contracts may indicate whether this should be in the context of a g
eneral 
codification of transactions in intangible information, similar to article 2B
 of the 
UCC. 
A Should NZ Follow Article 2B of the UCC? 
Andas Finance Ltd v Te Kaha Hotel Ltd
125 concerned a contract for the supply of 
a computer , software and training. The computer was delivered but most
 of the 
software and the training were never supplied. After unsuccessfully attem
pting 
to get the supplier to perform, the defendant concluded that the contract w
as not 
going to be fulfilled and stopped making payments. Applying the Contr
actual 
Remedies Act 1979, the Judge decided that the contract had been rig
htfully 
cancelled due to misrepresentations as to the ability of the of the supp
lier to 
provide the software and training . 
Under the UCC, the contract would have been dealt with under Article 2 (
which 
deals with the sale of goods) as regards the computer and draft Article 
2B as 
regards the software and support training. Cancellation would be allow
ed if 
there had been a material breach of the entire contract which had not be cu
red or 
125 Andas Finance Ltd v Te Kaha Hotel Ltd (4 July 1989) unreported , High 
Court, Rotorua, CP 
194/87, Smellie J . 
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waived. Clearly, failure to supply both the majority of the software or the 
training was a material breach of the entire contract and it had not been either 
cured or waived. Thus, under the UCC, the defendant would have been entitled 
to cancel. At that point, all executory obligations would have been discharged 
(as under the Contractual Remedies Act). However, the cancellation would also 
have ended any right the defendant had under the contract to use the information 
or copies supplied (i.e. the software that had been delivered). 126 Under the 
Contractual Remedies Act the defendant would not, merely by reason of the 
cancellation, have been divested of any property transferred pursuant to the 
contract. 127 
Progeni Systems Ltd v Hampton Studios Ltd128 also concerned the cancellation of 
a contract on the grounds of misrepresentation. The defendant had engaged the 
plaintiff as a consultant to advise it on the availability of "off-the-shelf" software 
that would suit its business needs. On being advised that no suitable packages 
were available, the defendant hired the plaintiff to create customised software 
for it. Later, the defendant discovered that a suitable software package had been 
available and purported to cancel the contract for the customised software on the 
grounds of misrepresentation. 
The Judge found that the defendant had rightfully cancelled under section 7 of 
the Contractual Remedies Act as the parties had impliedly agreed that the 
representation was essential to the defendant. The defendant asked for damages 
under section 9 of the Contractual Remedies Act, which gives the court very 
broad powers to grant relief to either party. This is so broad it can easily 
encompass the special requirement of intangible goods. The section does not 
preclude further action for damages for misrepresentation, repudiation or 
breach. However, any relief given under section 9 must be taken into account in 
granting such damages. 
126 "Article 28" above n 62, s 702. 
127 Contractual Remedies Act 1979, s8(3). 
128 Progeni Sysrems Ltd v Hampron Srudios Ltd (11 August 1987) unreported, High Court, 
Christchurch, CP 105/86, Tipping J. 
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Under Article 2B, the licensee is entitled to direct, incidental and consequential 
damages. 129 The section sets out in some detail several methods of calculating 
the damages. The licensee is given a choice between various methods, subject 
to a ban on double recovery. The main difference is that there is no general 
discretion, such as section 9 provides, whereby the judge can grant any relief he 
or she thinks appropriate applying general principles applicable to any contract. 
In Works Civil Construction Ltd v Does Not Compute Ltd, 130 a term in a contract 
to supply hardware, software and system support services forbade assignment of 
the contract without consent. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to 
decline consent to the assignment of the agreement and that the law did not 
imply a condition that the consent should not be unreasonably withheld. A 
similar result would have been reached under draft article 2B which places great 
emphasis on freedom of contract. 
These judgments suggest that the general nature of New Zealand contract law 
enables it to respond in a flexible manner to the issues posed by intangible 
information products. Lacking a detailed codified commercial law like the 
UCC, we have no need to "update" in the same sense. Broadly worded statutes 
of general applicability seem able to cope with new technological developments 
through the extension of case law. 
B A Specific Statute Validating Shrink-Wrap Licences? 
Although our contract law is flexible and seems well able to deal with issues that 
arise where a valid contract is present, the problem with mass market shrink-
wrap licence transactions is their lack of validity under black letter contract law. 
Thus, a specific statute is necessary to legitimate shrink-wrap licences. Drawing 
129 "Article 2B" above n 62, s 709. 
tJo Works Civil Construction Ltd v Does Not Compute Ltd (22 July 1992) unreported, High Court, 
Wellington, CP 46/92, Master Williams. 
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upon the case law and Article 2B, such a statute could provide a regime which 
the licensor could follow to ensure a valid licence. 
A purchaser should be able to assent to a shrink-wrap licence by conduct, as 
long as he or she was aware of the terms of the licence or had an opportunity to 
review them. A manifestation of assent would consist of conduct which the 
purchaser knew or reasonably ought to have known, would indicate assent to the 
other party. Where the purchaser does not have an opportunity to review the 
licence before paying, there must be a right to a refund if the purchaser does not 
wish to accept the terms of the licence once they became known. The purchaser 
must also be entitled to payment of reasonable expenses incurred in returning the 
product and compensation for any damage caused to the users computer if it 
were necessary to view the licence on-line. 
Article 2B also offers a guide for determining the relationship between the 
several parties in retail transactions. The statute should determine that the user 
has a right of refund directly off the retailer and the retailer should be bound to 
distribute the material as packaged by the licensor. 
The statute should state that mass market software supplied on a physical 
medium was a good for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act 1908 and the 
Consumers Guarantee Act 1993. Where software is delivered without a physical 
medium, it should be deemed a good for the purposes of these Acts, except with 
regard to delivery. Specific rules would be necessary to regulate delivery. 
Again, Article 2B may provide guidance. This should provide adequate 
consumer protection to shrink-wrap licensees. 
However, it is also important to ensure that software producers do not use 
shrink-wrap licences to illegitimately extend their rights in information. New 
Zealand is a net importer of intellectual property. As such, it should look hard 
at allowing stronger intellectual property rights than are required, either under 
international agreements or to satisfy its major trading partners. The benefit of 
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such rights would largely flow out of New Zealand. New Zealand's small 
software industry may be disadvantaged by such laws, if they result in a less 
competitive environment. This seems likely, as a ban on any form of reverse 
engineering is very common in shrink-wrap licences. 
C Guarding Against De Facto Intellectual Property Rights 
In the United States, the response to the prospect of valid shrink-wrap licences 
under Article 2B has been a proposal that judges be empowered to refuse to 
enforce contracts or terms which are contrary to public policies relating to 
innovation, competition, and free expression. 131 It is tempting to borrow from 
the United States again, but unfortunately, due to differences in our intellectual 
property law, such a solution may not be effective in New Zealand. 
Intellectual property law in the United States is based on a constitutional 
requirement to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts". 132 The 
Copyright Act is interpreted in light of this underlying purpose. The Act grants 
free-wheeling fair use rights for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, scholarship or research. The non-specific nature of the fair 
use provision requires judges to consider the policy behind protecting these 
particular uses. The constitutional guarantee of free speech 133 influences the 
interpretation of copyright law, particularly with regard to fair use. Because of 
these factors, the United States has developed broad public policies with regard 
to innovation, competition and free expression in the context of intellectual 
property rights. 
In contrast, New Zealand intellectual property law is not overtly based on the 
promotion of knowledge and science. What policy we have with regard to 
innovation, competition and free expression, vis a vis copyright, is completely 
131 Proposed article 2B-110, discussed above in part IV D. 
132 US Const art I, s 8, cl 8. 
133 US Const 1st amendment. 
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embodied in the Copyright Act 1994. These policies are expressed in the 
idea/expression dichotomy 134 and the exceptions to copyright infringement such 
as fair dealing, 135 copying for educational purposes, 136 and replacement copying 
by libraries and archivists. 137 However, these are not affirmative rights but are 
merely not copyright infringements. Nor are the fair use exceptions free 
wheeling as in the United States; they are limited to specific exceptions. 
Thus, if we permit shrink-wrap licensing, subject to public policies with regard 
to innovation, competition, and free expression, we would run the risk of 
legitimating the creation of de facto rights by contract. If the Copyright Act 
does not grant positive rights to users, there is no public policy reason why 
software producers should not be able to restrict such uses by contract. 
A solution may be to import public policy factors, with regard to innovation, 
competition and free speech, into the Copyright Act. This could be achieved by 
inserting a suitable purpose clause into the Act. Such a purpose clause could 
draw upon the preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, which New 
Zealand intends to sign. 138 The preamble emphasises the significance of 
copyright protection as an incentive for literary and artistic creation and 
recognises the need to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the 
larger public interest, particularly education, research and access to information. 
However, such a provision would create a significant change in New Zealand 
copyright policy. It may be argued that such a change is not justified merely to 
solve the problems associated with shrink-wrap licensing. I would suggest that 
it is time to re-examine the basis of New Zealand copyright law. The 
134 In Television New 'Zealand Ltd v Newsmonitor Services Ltd (1994] 2 NZLR 91, Blanchard J 
found that s 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act , which affirms the right to freedom of 
expression, did not require any change in the interpretation of the Copyright Act. 
Effectively, the Copyright Act contained within itself the definitive policy on freedom of 
expression in the form of the ideas/expression dichotomy. 
135 Copyright Act 1994, ss 42 and 43. 
136 Copyright Act 1994, ss 44 , 46 and 49. 
137 Copyright Act 1994, s 55 . 
138 Information supplied by the Ministry of Commerce, telephone conversation, 23 September 1998. 
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development of the digital information industry prompts such re-examination as 
it exposes the problems with an intellectual property law that is not overtly 
based on the encouragement of innovation and knowledge. Such a law lacks the 
guidance necessary for case law to respond flexibly to new developments in 
technology. 
Nor can the problem of de facto intellectual property rights m digital 
information be avoided by not validating shrink-wrap licences. There is 
growing use of Internet delivery of mass market software using click-wrap 
licences. 139 These licences present the terms to the purchaser before the contract 
is formed. As they usually do not involve a supplier, there are no problems 
with privity of contract. Thus, there is no reason why the contracts may not be 
valid under black letter contract law. 
However, importing an intention to encourage innovation and knowledge into 
the Copyright Act may well be considered too radical. A more restrained means 
of protecting the public interest in information would be the creation of 
inalienable rights for software users. These could be limited rights, which apply 
to all software users, or more expansive rights, granted to shrink-wrap licensees 
only. 
The European Union has provided certain basic user rights for software 
licensees which cannot be contracted out of. 140 These rights include the right to 
decompile to achieve interoperability with independently created programs and 
the right to use a device or means which observes, studies or tests the 
functioning or the program in order to understand the underlying ideas or 
principles. 
This approach has the advantage of certainty. However, it is not very flexible. 
It is difficult to say that a particular use should always be permitted and so 
139 Mark A Lemley "Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace" (1995) Jurimetrics Journal 311, 320. 
140 The European Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Directive 
91/250). 
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inalienable rights will always be very limited, even when restricted to shrink-
wrap licensees. 
Inalienable rights are a blunt tool. It is preferable, in my view, to empower 
judges to weigh the public interest in allowing particular contractual restrictions 
against the public interest in maintaining the boundaries of the public 
information domain. 
IX CONCLUSION 
Shrink-wrap licences are part of the modern, mass production economy and, like 
all standard form licences, offer benefits of cost reduction and efficiency. In 
addition, shrink-wrap licences allow software producers the ability to tailor 
software products so that the price paid is commensurate with the use made. 
Without the ability to do this, software producers would have to charge a single 
price to cover all uses, which would be to the detriment of consumers and the 
software industry alike. 
Shrink-wrap licences are probably unenforceable under black letter contract law. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to give them contractual validity by statute. 
Such a statute could draw upon the provisions of the UCC draft Article 2B, 
which establishes a regime for mass market software transactions which are 
accompanied by mass market licences. 
However, while shrink-wrap licences are beneficial, they are also problematic. 
Because of the intangible nature of software, they may enable the software 
producer to extend his or her rights in the information in a manner that is not 
possible with tangible information products. Any validation of shrink-wrap 
licensing must guard against allowing the licence to be used in this way. One 
means of preventing such use would be to allow the court to refuse to enforce 
terms which were contrary to public policies relating to innovation, competition, 
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and free expression. The software producer would be able defend such a term 
by showing that it was commercially necessary. 
Such an approach would require changes to the Copyright Act 1994. Currently, 
the Act is not based upon any conception of copyright as a right granted to 
promote science and the arts, as is the United States Copyright Act. Hence, we 
have not developed public policy doctrines with regard to innovation, 
competition and free expression in relation to copyright law. However, it would 
be possible to provide guidance to the interpretation of copyright law in a 
manner that took account of these factors by providing a suitable purpose 
provision for the Act. 
Enacting such a provision would represent a major change in New Zealand's 
intellectual property law. A less radical solution to the problem of de facto 
intellectual property rights would be the creation of inalienable user rights for 
software buyers, as has occurred in the European Union. Limited rights could 
be granted to all software licensees. Or, more expansive rights could be granted 
to shrink-wrap licensees only. 
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